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CATCHING THE WAIVE: THE THIRD CIRCUIT JOINS
THE GROWING TREND OF CIRCUIT COURTS IN
VOIDING A CLASS-ARBITRATION WAIVER
IN HOMA v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO.
I. INTRODUCTION
The tiny print of a mandatory arbitration clause, often buried deep in
a multi-page standard form contract, likely evades the average consumer.'
While the inclusion of these provisions in the most common of consumer
agreements is becoming more and more prevalent, few recognize the sig-
nificant waiver of rights that accompanies acquiescence to such agree-
ments.2 Suddenly, without more than a pen stroke, the consumer agrees
to settle all disputes arising out of the agreement with the corporation
through binding arbitration and relinquishes all rights to traditional in-
court litigation.3 Now, with the proliferation of these mandatory arbitra-
1. See Press Release, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., Consumer and Media Alert:
The Small Print That's Devastating Major Consumer Rights (July 28, 2003), availa-
ble at http://www.consumerlaw.org/issues/model/arbitration.shtml (announcing
that mandatory arbitration clauses found in everyday consumer agreements are "a
giant trap door for consumers"). Blindly agreeing to contract provisions is a be-
havior routinely exhibited by the average consumer. See W. David Slawson, Stan-
dard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REv. 529,
529 (1971) (recognizing that "an active consumer enters scores of contracts every
week without in any real sense agreeing to the terms that are imposed upon him").
David Slawson laments what was once the common consumer culture where "both
parties participate[d] in choosing the language of their entire agreement." See
Slawson, supra, at 529 (acknowledging that standard form contracts "have come to
dominate" consumer transactions); see also Emma Wilson, Douglas v. Talk America:
Making the Case for Proper Notice, 45 IDAHO L. REv. 479, 479-80 (2009) (commenting
on how proliferation of standard form contracts has "tremendously influenced
consumer transactions").
2. See Press Release, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 1 (reporting that
mandatory arbitration clauses are "popping up not only in [credit card agreements
and health plans,] but also in mortgages and other loans, phone bills, home con-
struction and repair contracts, stock brokerage agreements, pest-control contracts,
bank depositors' agreements, college loans, mobile home purchases, employment
agreements and many more" types of consumer contracts); see also Linda J. De-
maine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitra-
tion Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 55, 56, 62
n.30 (2004) (indicating that in recent years "the profile of arbitration has changed
dramatically" to point where "55.1% of businesses that offer an ongoing product
or service and use a written contract [include] an arbitration clause").
3. See Press Release, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 1 (illustrating rights
waived by agreeing to mandatory arbitration); see also Bryon Allyn Rice, Enforceable
or Not?: Class Action Waivers in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the Need for a judicial
Standard, 45 Hous. L. REv. 215, 217 (2008) ("These contract clauses restrict con-
sumers' rights to pursue any complaints against defendant companies via the court
system by compelling plaintiffs to seek vindication through an arbitration pro-
cess."). Below is an example of a typical mandatory arbitration provision:
(1033)
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tion clauses, the trend in consumer contracts is to include a ban on class
mechanisms in the arbitral forum-meet the class-arbitration waiver.4
A class-arbitration waiver relinquishes "the right to participate in class-
wide arbitration or to aggregate claims with others in any form of . . .
arbitral proceeding."5 As one might imagine, judicial recognition of the
You and we agree that any claim, dispute, or controversy between us ...
and any claim arising from or relating to this Note, no matter by whom or
against whom ... including the validity of this Note and of this agreement
to arbitrate disputes as well as claims alleging fraud or misrepresentation
shall be resolved by binding arbitration ... NOTICE: YOU AND WE
WOULD HAVE HAD A RIGHT OR OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE DIS-
PUTES THROUGH A COURT BUT HAVE AGREED INSTEAD TO RE-
SOLVE DISPUTES THROUGH BINDING ARBITRATION.
Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369-70 (3d Cir. 2000) (providing text
of arbitration clause at issue).
4. See Falon M. Wrigley, Kristian v. Comcast: Another Drop in the Bucket, or the
Achilles Heel of Arbitration Agreements Banning Class Mechanisms?, 27 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REv. 163, 163 (2007) (documenting increasing popularity of class-arbitra-
tion waivers); see also Leah Snyder Batchis, Third Circuit Chimes in on Controversy
Surrounding Enforcement of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Class Action Waivers,
Holding that Certain Class Action Waivers May Be Unconscionable Under New Jersey Law,
SCHNADER ALERT (Sept. 27, 2009), http://www.schnader.com/files/Publication/c6
fafd90-d4a7-481 b-80b2-3fa95bcee5/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f40e6
afl-19a0-4cfe-9255-44b3a0bda752/APG%20and%20FSL-Third%2OCircuit%20
Chimes%20in %200n%20Controversy%2003.2009.pdf (noting "growing trend
among financial services providers to include mandatory arbitration clauses and
class action waivers in consumer credit card contracts"). Until recently, "most
courts refused to allow individuals to seek class certification within an arbitration
except where the arbitration agreement expressly authorized individuals to main-
tain class actions." See Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas, Enforceability of Class
Arbitration Waiver Clauses, 239 N.Y. L.J. 23 (2008) (explaining that Supreme Court's
decision in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003), reversed trend); see
also AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, 2005 PRESIDENT's LETTER & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 3
(2005), available at http://www.adr.org/annual-reports (follow "2005 ANNUAL
REPORT" hyperlink) ("Implicit in the [Bazzle] decision is that class action pro-
ceedings could take place in an arbitration setting.").
5. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of
the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REv. 373, 376 n.15 (2005) (explaining effect
of class-arbitration waivers); see also Paul Karlsgodt, The Latest on Class Arbitration
Waivers, CLAssAcTiONBLAWG.COM (Aug. 28, 2008), http://classactionblawg.com/
2 0 0 8 /08/28/the-latest-on-class-arbitration-waivers/ (defining class-arbitration
waivers as "contract clauses requiring arbitration but prohibiting class treatment of
claims in the arbitration"). Below is an example of a typical class-arbitration
waiver:
THERE SHALL BE NO RIGHT OR AUTHORITY FOR ANY CLAIMS TO
BE ARBITRATED ON A CLASS ACTION OR CONSOLIDATED BASIS
OR ON BASES INVOLVING CLAIMS BROUGHT IN A PURPORTED
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY ON BEHALF OF THE GENERAL PUB-
LIC (SUCH AS A PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL), OTHER SUB-
SCRIBERS, OR OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED.
Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 53 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting terms provided
in class-arbitration waiver at issue). For additional examples of class-arbitration
waiver provisions, see Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the
Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1, 6 n.5 (2000).
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validity of class-arbitration waivers has been controversial and varied.'
Many courts that once "overwhelmingly embraced" mandatory arbitration
clauses are now attempting to cope with the lack of a judicial standard for
analyzing the enforceability of class-arbitration waivers. 7 Some commenta-
tors argue that bolstering standard form contracts with class-arbitration
waivers is a "surreptitious" technique used by corporations as a means of
avoiding liability altogether.8 Conversely, corporate defendants, who
often view the class action ban as the most valuable provision in an arbitra-
tion clause, contend that the class action remedy allows plaintiffs to extort
inequitable settlements from innocent defendants.9
Federal circuit courts are currently split on the question of whether to
enforce class action bans in the arbitral forum; however, what was once a
staunch majority in favor of upholding class-arbitration waivers has devel-
oped into a distinct trend of courts refusing to enforce class-arbitration
bans.10 Specifically, while the overwhelming body of case law upholds the
6. For a discussion of the varying conclusions reached by courts regarding the
validity of class-arbitration waivers, see infra notes 39-78 and accompanying text.
7. See Rice, supra note 3, at 218-19 (discussing how addition of class action
waiver in otherwise enforceable mandatory arbitration clause has left question of
whether ban on class actions in mandatory arbitration clauses is enforceable and
commenting on lack of uniform judicial standard among federal and state courts
confronted with issue of class-arbitration waivers).
8. See Sternlight, supra note 5, at 5 ("Today, such potential defendants ...
have found a surreptitious way to defeat the feared class action: mandatory binding
arbitration."); see also Robert S. Safi, Beyond Unconscionability: Preserving the Class
Mechanism Under State Law in the Era of Consumer Arbitration, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1715,
1716 (2005) (opining that arbitration is being exploited "as a means of completely
avoiding liability").
9. See F. Paul Bland, Jr. & Claire Prestel, Challenging Class Action Bans in
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFuicr RESOL. 369, 370 (2009) (ex-
plaining how class action ban is often characterized as most valuable provision in
arbitration clause from company's perspective); Sternlight, supra note 5, at 6 ("The
companies and attorneys who seek to use arbitration to eliminate class actions con-
tend that plaintiffs, and especially their attorneys, exploit the class action remedy
as a way to extort unfair settlements from innocent defendants."); see also Muham-
mad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 101, 102 n.6 (N.J.
2006) (recognizing that courts and commentators have acknowledged pressure
that potential class action places on corporate defendants to settle "arguably frivo-
lous claims"). But see Sternlight, supra note 5, at 6-9 (examining possible ulterior
motive potential defendants may have, which leads them to incorporate class ac-
tion bans in arbitration clauses). "The potential defendants know that because
many claims are not viable if brought individually, plaintiffs will often drop or fail
to initiate claims once it is clear that class relief is unavailable." Id. at 9.
10. See Rice, supra note 3, at 226 (indicating that when article was published
in 2008, "the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits
[had] all upheld compulsory class arbitration waivers"). But see Karlsgodt, supra
note 5 ("Although courts have upheld class arbitration waivers . . . under some
circumstances, the trend seems to favor striking them down as unconscionable or
void as against public policy, especially in consumer contracts where any individual
dispute is likely to involve only small amounts of money."); Bland & Prestel, supra
note 9, at 374 n.25 (noting "definite trend" of courts striking class-arbitration waiv-
ers as unconscionable (citing Pamela MacLean, Class Action Waivers Hit a Wall, 29
CASEBRIEF 10352010]
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enforceability of such class-arbitration waiver provisions, a growing num-
ber of circuits have held that class-arbitration waivers are "unconscionable,
void as against public policy, or otherwise unenforceable when they effec-
tively exculpate corporate defendants from any meaningful liability for
their alleged misconduct."" To date, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has handed down rulings straddling both sides of the
debate.12
The Third Circuit first encountered this issue in Johnson v. West Subur-
ban Bank'3 and found that parties are free to contractually waive judicial
remedies in favor of arbitration so long as legislative intent does not articu-
late otherwise.' 4 As a result, the court enforced the arbitration clause in
question even though it rendered the class action remedy unavailable.15
Then, in Gay v. CreditInform,16 the Third Circuit, along with enforcing the
defendant's class-arbitration waiver, ostensibly held that the Federal Arbi-
tration Act (FAA)1 7 preempted consideration of state law contract de-
fenses.18 A mere two years later, however, as both a reaction to rampant
misinterpretation of its Gay holding and a response to evolving case law,
NAT'L L. J. 5 (2007))). For a discussion on the current status of the circuit split,
see infra note 119 and accompanying text.
11. See Veronica D. Jackson, The End of the Arbitration Clause?, CONSUMER FIN.
L. BLOo (Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.consumerfinancelawblog.com/2009/04/arti-
cles/class-action/the-end-of-the-arbitration-clause/ (acknowledging that majority
of precedents uphold arbitration and class waiver provisions); see also Bland &
Prestel, supra note 9, at 370 (discussing recent trend in case law).
12. Compare Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 395 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding
waiver of right to bring class action did not render arbitration clause unconsciona-
ble), andJohnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000) (enforc-
ing class-arbitration waiver where plaintiff agreed to binding arbitration in loan
agreement and there was no congressional intent to preclude enforcement of arbi-
tration clauses in either Truth In Lending Act or Electronic Fund Transfer Act),
with Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225, 233 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding "if the
claims at issue are of such a low value as effectively to preclude relief if decided
individually, then ... the class-arbitration waiver is unconscionable"). For further
analysis of the Third Circuit's treatment of class-arbitration waivers, see infra notes
39-118 and accompanying text.
13. 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000).
14. See id. at 369 (stating holding of case).
15. See id. (detailing court's holding). For further discussion of Johnson's
place in Third Circuit class-arbitration waiver jurisprudence, see infra notes 39-47
and accompanying text.
16. 511 F.3d 269 (3d Cir. 2007).
17. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
18. SeeJessie Kokrda Kamens, Third Circuit Limits Holding in Gay, Finds Class
Arbitration Waiver Unconscionable, 10 CLAsS AcrIoN LITIG. REP. (BNA) 184 (2009)
(explaining that initial understanding of Gay's holding was that Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA) "preempted consideration of state law contract defenses"). The
application of the preemption holding in Gay was substantially limited by the
Third Circuit in its subsequent decision in Homa. See id. (discussing Homa's impact
on Gay). For further discussion of Homa's limiting effect on Gay, see infra notes 95-
100 and accompanying text.
1036 [Vol. 55: p. 1033
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the court, in the precedential decision Homa v. American Express Co.,' 9 re-
versed a district court order upholding the enforcement of a class-arbitra-
tion waiver.20 Joining the growing trend among circuit courts, the Third
Circuit concluded in Homa that class-arbitration waivers in credit card
holder agreements are likely unenforceable. 2 '
This Casebrief identifies the Third Circuit's current treatment of
class-arbitration waivers and serves as a guide to practitioners bringing or
defending claims that a particular contractual class-arbitration waiver is
unenforceable. 2 2 Part 11 reviews the arguments for and against class-arbi-
tration waivers in mandatory arbitration clauses and provides a chronology
of the Third Circuit's treatment of class-arbitration waivers.2 3 Part III de-
tails the factual background and holding in Homa, as well as explains the
Third Circuit's rationale in determining that contractual class-arbitration
waivers can be challenged as unconscionable under state law.24 Part IV
examines Homa's effect on class-arbitration waiver jurisprudence within
the Third Circuit and discusses the growing trend among circuit courts of
refusing to uphold class-arbitration waivers.2 5 It also highlights the draft-
ing adjustments that companies should make to consumer contracts post-
Homa.2 6 Finally, Part V concludes that the Third Circuit's Homa decision
provides an effective blueprint from which to develop a viable judicial
standard for judging the validity of class-arbitration waivers.2 7
19. 558 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2009).
20. See Kamens, supra note 18 (declaring Homa decision to be "incredibly im-
portant," as "Third Circuit clarified that the preemption ruling in the Gay decision
is narrow and only applies to the idiosyncratic law in Pennsylvania"); see also Third
Circuit Rejects Enforcement of Class-Arbitration Waiver, BLANK ROME CoRP. LITIG. ALERT
(Mar. 2009), http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentlD=37&itemlD=1896
("Adding to a developing trend, the Third Circuit reversed [the district court or-
der], and determined instead that if the claims at issue are of such low value that a
consumer likely would not pursue an individual claim, enforcement of the waiver
provision would be unconscionable under New Jersey law.").
21. Homa, 558 F.3d at 233 (stating Third Circuit's holding).
22. For a discussion of the enforceability of class-arbitration waivers within the
Third Circuit, see infra notes 95-118 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the historical development and treatment of class-arbi-
tration waivers within the Third Circuit and, more generally, within federal juris-
prudence, see infra notes 36-78 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the facts and the Third Circuit's holding in Homa, see
infra notes 79-118 and accompanying text.
25. For a complete discussion of Homa's wide-reaching impact on class-arbi-
tration waiver jurisprudence within the Third Circuit and beyond, see infra notes
123-41 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the changes companies should make in their con-
sumer contracts post-Homa, see infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the possibility and the benefits of adopting a judicial
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Class-Arbitration Waiver. "Efficient Business Practice
or Unconscionable Abuse?"2 8
The class-arbitration waiver is a relatively new phenomenon.2 9 Prior
to Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,30 most courts did not permit class-
wide arbitration except where expressly authorized by an arbitration
agreement.3 1 Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to di-
rectly rule on the enforceability of class-arbitration waivers, it intimated in
Bazzle that class actions can be pursued in the arbitral setting. 32 With Baz-
28. The heading of this section was inspired by the title of an article
coauthored by Jean R. Sternlight and Elizabeth J. Jenson. SeeJean R. Sternlight &
Elizabeth J. Jenson, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient
Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 75 (2004)
(analyzing both sides of debate over validity of class-arbitration waivers).
29. For a complete discussion of the proliferation of the class-arbitration
waiver, see supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
30. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
31. See Klein & Pappas, supra note 4 (recounting history of class actions in
arbitral setting). For a comprehensive examination of Bazzle's effect on class-arbi-
tration waiver jurisprudence, see P. Christine Deruele & Robert Clayton Roesch,
Gaming the Rigged Class Arbitration Game: How We Got Here and Where We Go Now -
Part I, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL., Aug. 2007, at 9, available at http://www.metrocorp
counsel.com/current.php?artType=view&artMonth=August&artYear=2007&Entry
No=6992.
32. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 450-51 (recognizing possibility of arbitral class ac-
tions); see also Safi, supra note 8, at 1716 (noting that Bazzle "signals the Court's
acceptance of class arbitration"); AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, 2005 PRESIDENT'S LETTER
& FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 4, at 3 ("Implicit in [Bazzle] is that class action
proceedings could take place in an arbitration setting."). In Bazzle, the Court de-
clined to expressly determine whether arbitration could proceed on a class-wide
basis. See Wrigley, supra note 4, at 181 (discussing Bazzle's holding); cf Green Tree
Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (examining previous instance
of Court expressly declining to decide class-arbitration waiver issue when con-
fronted with it and instead choosing to decide case on other grounds). The Court,
however, implicitly recognized the legitimacy of arbitral class actions when it noted
that an arbitration clause's silence on the matter of class actions indicated the
absence of the contracting parties' intent to waive the class mechanism. See Rice,
supra note 3, at 249 (analyzing Bazzle's holding); see also Klein & Pappas, supra note
4 ("In Bazzle, the Supreme Court recognized that even where an arbitration agree-
ment makes no mention of class actions or the possibility that nonparties to the
arbitration agreement might be permitted to assert claims for relief, an individual
claim could be transformed into a class action."). But see Nina Yadava, Can You
Hear Me Now? The Courts Send a Stronger Signal Regarding Arbitration Class Action
Waivers in Consumer Telecommunications Contracts, 41 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 547,
570 (2008) (explaining that "Court did not deem class actions and arbitrations
compatible, thereby allowing the theory of incompatibility to persist if the arbitra-
tor supports it"). Bazzle further indicates that when an arbitration clause is silent
on the matter of class arbitration, it is up to the arbitrator, not a court, to deter-
mine whether the matter should be able to proceed on a class-wide basis. See Baz-
zle, 539 U.S. at 452-53 (ruling that arbitrators, not courts, should interpret these
contracts); see also Sternlight & Jenson, supra note 28, at 76 n.4 (stating that "the
Court remanded to the arbitrator the question whether, given the terms of the
particular arbitration clause, an arbitral class action was permitted").
1038 [Vol. 55: p. 1033
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zle marking the Court's unofficial acceptance of class-wide arbitration,
many companies responded by including class action waivers in arbitration
agreements. 3 3 Corporate defendants contend that this practice is neces-
sary to protect against "the unexpected expense, risk, and lack of procedu-
ral safeguards, including full appellate rights, inherent in class
arbitration."3 4 On the other hand, plaintiffs argue that such clauses are
inserted to completely immunize corporations from liability, and that the
class action remedy is the most effective way to redress exploitation of con-
sumers and, therefore, must be preserved.35
B. The Federal Arbitration Act
Originally enacted in 1925, the FAA was intended to "place arbitra-
tion agreements upon the same footing as other contracts."3 6 Under the
33. See Klein & Pappas, supra note 4 ("Many [companies] have responded to
Bazzle by crafting arbitration agreements that expressly prohibit class arbitration.").
34. See id. (illustrating corporate response to Bazzle); cf Rice, supra note 3, at
224 ("Corporate defense attorneys tout the use of the class-action arbitration bans
as a legitimate contract tool used to defend benevolent companies from the ever-
increasing onslaught of frivolous 'multimillion-dollar class action lawsuits."').
35. See Cari K Dawson, Arbitration Agreements: No Longer Defendants' Silver Bullet
to Defeat Class Actions, 22 ANDREWS CORP. OFFICERS AND DIR. LIAB. LITIG. REP. 13
(2007) (summarizing arguments of plaintiffs involved in disputes over class-arbitra-
tion waivers); see generally Sternlight & Jenson, supra note 28, at 85-92 (docu-
menting arguments that influence courts to find particular class action
prohibitions unconscionable). Other arguments submitted by plaintiffs in favor of
the class action mechanism include, but are not limited to, the fact that class ac-
tions are: (1) necessary to support modest claims; (2) serve a deterrent purpose;
and (3) facilitate the discovery of claims among absent class members. See Bland &
Prestel, supra note 9, at 376-80 (listing arguments proffered by plaintiffs).
36. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (dis-
cussing history and purpose of FAA). The FAA recognizes the validity and enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (declaring "[v]alidity,
irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate"). FAA Section 2
provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a con-
tract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.
Id. (emphasis added). Although the FAA legitimized agreements to arbitrate as
early as 1925, arbitration has not always been fully accepted as a valid course of
dispute resolution. Compare Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (stating purpose of FAA "was to
reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had ex-
isted at English common law and had been adopted by American courts"), with
Wrigley, supra note 4, at 167 (discussing how courts and legislatures were still
"skeptical of arbitration," even after codification of FAA, but have since accepted
arbitration). Since the 1980s, however, arbitration agreements between compa-
nies and consumers have actually been "favored" by the U.S. Supreme Court. See
Joshua S. Lipshutz, The Court's Implicit Roadmap: Charting the Prudent Course at the
Juncture of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Lawsuits, 57 STAN. L.
10392010] CASEBRIEF
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FAA's primary substantive provision, Section 2, "an agreement in writing
to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of [a transac-
tion involving commerce] shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."3 7 While agreements to arbitrate are now generally enforced, a
fissure arises among the courts when a class action waiver is incorporated
into a mandatory arbitration provision.38
C. The Third Circuit's Treatment of Class-Arbitration Waivers
Because the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the enforceability of
class-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts, "a kaleidoscope of conflict-
ing decisions" has emerged among federal and state courts considering
the issue-the Third Circuit is no exception.39 The Third Circuit's first
major decision on class-arbitration waivers had a considerable impact on
several other circuit courts.40 In Johnson, the Third Circuit considered
whether claims under the Truth in Lending Act (TIIA) could be heard in
the arbitral setting when the plaintiff sought to bring a class action against
the defendant lenders.41 The plaintiff argued that the mandatory arbitra-
tion clause, which compelled arbitration to the exclusion of any potential
class action, clashed with the legislative intent of TILA."2 The Third Cir-
cuit disagreed, however, noting that nothing in the statutory language or
legislative history of TILA indicates that "parties cannot [voluntarily] waive
judicial remedies in favor of arbitration," even if the opportunity to bring
a class action is lost."3 Absent such contrary legislative intent, the court
REv. 1677, 1678 n.1 (2005) (recognizing that Court first documented its policy of
"favoring" arbitration in Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1 (1983)).
37. 9 U.S.C. § 2. For the full text of FAA Section 2, see supra note 36.
38. See Lipshutz, supra note 36, at 1680-81 ("It is generally settled law that
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements will be enforced by courts despite
being contained in contracts of adhesion, subject only to being voided on tradi-
tional contract grounds."); see also Michael C. Duffy, Making Waives: Reining in Class
Action Waivers in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion, 80 TEMP. L. REv. 847, 858 (2007)
(discussing inconsistent stance on class action waiver issue among state courts);
Rice, supra note 3, at 226 (acknowledging circuit split on issue of whether to up-
hold class-arbitration waivers).
39. See Dawson, supra note 35 (discussing circuit split).
40. SeeJohnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000) (rul-
ing for first time on class-arbitration waiver issue); Duffy, supra note 38, at 851-53
(documenting widespread reliance on Johnson, including in the Fourth, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits).
41. See Johnson, 225 F.3d at 368 (reciting issue facing court). The question
before the court was an issue of first impression in the Third Circuit. See id. (dis-
cussing historical treatment of class-arbitrations waivers).
42. See id. at 368-69 (describing facts of case). The arbitration clause was in-
cluded in an adhesion contract adopted by the plaintiff in connection with a loan.
See id. at 368 (describing facts of case).
43. See id. at 369 ("[B]ecause we can discern no congressional intent to pre-
clude the enforcement of arbitration clauses in either statute's text, legislative his-
tory, or purpose, we hold that such clauses are effective even though they may
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concluded that the arbitral class action bar was enforceable based on three
assertions: (1) class actions do not automatically provide plaintiffs with
healthier incentives to bring individual suits;4 4 (2) plaintiffs can still ac-
quire representation without the class action mechanism because attor-
ney's fees are recoverable under TILA;45 and (3) TILA's administrative
enforcement provisions can still deter violators of TILA even if plaintiffs
are discouraged from bringing private suits. 4 6 After Johnson, a number of
other circuit courts heard similar cases and reached the same result as the
Third Circuit.47
Most of these circuit cases upholding class-arbitration waivers shared
two primary commonalities that, when absent in subsequent cases, seemed
to shift the trend of enforcement.4 8 In Kristian v. Comcast Corp.,49 the First
Circuit noted that, unlike prior decisions by the Third, Fourth, Seventh,
render class actions to pursue statutory claims under the TILA . .. unavailable.").
The court also noted the Supreme Court's position that the FAA created a power-
ful presumption in favor of arbitration. See id. at 369 (relying on Supreme Court
precedent). The court held that, under TILA, the right to a class action was
"merely a procedural one, arising under FED. R. Civ. P. 23, which may be waived by
agreeing to an arbitration clause." See id. (stating court's holding). The court fur-
ther acknowledged that, even though fewer plaintiffs would seek to enforce TILA
against offending creditors due to the unavailability of the class remedy, the waiver
of class remedies was permissible absent an express congressional pronouncement.
See id. at 374.
44. See id. ("[S]ums available ... to individual plaintiffs are not automatically
increased by use of the class forum.. . . [I]ndividual plaintiff recoveries available
in a class action may be lower than those possible in individual suits because the
recovery available under TILA's statutory cap on class recoveries is spread over the
entire class.").
45. See id. at 374-75 ("Nor will arbitration necessarily choke off the supply of
lawyers willing to pursue claims on behalf of debtors. Attorneys' fees are recover-
able under the TILA . .. and would therefore appear to be recoverable in arbitra-
tion, as arbitrators possess the power to fashion the same relief as courts.").
46. See id. at 375 ("[TILA's administrative enforcement] provisions offer
meaningful deterrents to violators of the TILA if private enforcement actions
should fail to fulfill that role.").
47. See Duffy, supra note 38, at 852 (noting that, as of 2007, Fourth, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits followed suit); see, e.g., Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339
F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Having found the Arbitration Agreement enforcea-
ble we must give full force to its terms . . . . The Arbitration Agreement at issue
here explicitly precludes . . . class claims or pursuing 'class action arbitration.'");
Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002) ("We
also reject [the plaintiffs] argument that the Arbitration Agreement is unenforce-
able as unconscionable because without the class action vehicle, she will be unable
to maintain her legal representation given the small amount of her individual
damages."); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir.
2001) ("We hold that a contractual provision to arbitrate TILA claims is enforcea-
ble even if it precludes a plaintiff from utilizing class action procedures in vindicat-
ing statutory rights under TILA.").
48. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 56 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that
Johnson, Livingston, Snowden, and Randolph had two important commonalities that
were absent in case at bar). For a discussion of the two commonalities, see infta
note 50 and accompanying text.
49. 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006).
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and Eleventh Circuits that upheld class-arbitration waivers, here: (1) attor-
ney's fees and costs were not recoverable by plaintiffs; and (2) the claim
did not arise under TI[A.5 0 Instead, the claim in Kristian was brought
under state and federal antitrust laws after Comcast Corporation allegedly
inflated the costs of their cable services through "anticompetitive prac-
tices." 5' Comcast sought to compel the plaintiff to arbitrate the claim on
an individual basis under a class-arbitration waiver provision, but the First
Circuit disagreed.5 2
In distinguishing Kristian from Johnson, the First Circuit highlighted
the inherently complex nature of an antitrust case as compared to a TIIA
violation.5 3 Namely, while a TIIA violation typically arises out of one par-
ticular transaction, an antitrust violation "is usually a complicated question
of fact" requiring the services of numerous expert witnesses.5 4 Conse-
quently, expert witness fees and attorney's fees could cost several million
dollars, with individual recovery ranging from "a few hundred dollars to a
few thousand dollars at most."5 5 In the First Circuit's view, such exorbi-
tant costs and complex legal issues undermined the Johnson court's ratio-
nales for supporting the class-arbitration ban.5 6 In essence, the First
Circuit determined that the Johnson court's three assertions were contra-
dicted by the "completely unrealistic and impractical" notion of spending
millions of dollars to prosecute a case where recovery for an individual
claim was so small.5 7
50. See id. at 56 (identifying that Johnson, Livingston, Snowden, and Randolph
had commonalities absent in Kristian: "First, attorney's fees and costs were either
recoverable by the plaintiffs who contested the arbitral forum on the basis of the
class arbitration ban, or the fees and costs issue was moot .. . [and second] the
plaintiffs raised claims against banks or other financial lenders primarily under the
TILA.").
51. See id. at 30 (stating case's factual and procedural history).
52. See id. at 31 (stating factual and procedural history of case). It should be
noted that, even though the arbitration agreement was added to Comcast's poli-
cies after the plaintiffs began receiving service from Comcast, the court found that
the arbitration policies applied retroactively. See id. at 64 (holding in favor of Com-
cast on issue of whether policies applied retroactively, but stating it still needed to
determine whether class-arbitration waiver was enforceable).
53. See id. at 58 (discussing difference between current case brought under
antitrust law and prior courts of appeals cases brought under TILA). The com-
plexity described by the court involved both the "complexity of an antitrust case
generally, and the complexity and cost required to prosecute a case against Com-
cast." See id. (discussing inherent complexity of antitrust cases).
54. See id. (discussing complex nature of antitrust cases).
55. See id. (noting that expert witness fees would cost between $300,000 and$600,000, attorneys fees would cost several million dollars, and individual recovery
would amount to few thousand dollars at most).
56. See id. (stating court's analysis).
57. See id. at 58-59 (discussing why complexity and cost associated with prose-
cuting antitrust claim against Comcast undermines Third Circuit's rationale in
Johnson). The First Circuit noted:
Johnson first asserts that a class action does not necessarily provide greater
incentives for private enforcement actions in the TILA context. Yet,
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A few months later, the Supreme Court of New Jersey implemented a
scheme comparable to that used by the Kristian court and issued two deci-
sions with wide-ranging implications.5 8 In companion cases decided the
same day, the court voided a class-arbitration waiver in Muhammad v.
County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware,59 but, in Delta Funding Corp. v. Har-
ris,6 o enforced a similar clause.6 1 The primary difference between the two
cases was the vast disparity in potential recovery if the claims were brought
on an individual basis.6 2
In Muhammad, the court invalidated the class-arbitration waiver in a
consumer loan contract because it effectively prevented the plaintiff from
bringing her claim on an individual basis due to the low value of her claim
(the court found that the maximum individual recovery was less than
$600).63 Due to the complexity and low value of the claim involved, the
Plaintiffs have provided uncontested and unopposed expert affidavits
demonstrating that without some form of class mechanism-be it class
action or class arbitration-a consumer antitrust plaintiff will not sue at
all... . Johnson's second assertion-that the availability of attorney's fees
provides the necessary incentive for private enforcement actions-simi-
larly finds little to no purchase in the antitrust context. A plaintiffs attor-
ney in the consumer antitrust context would be required to invest a large
initial outlay in time and money, including "opportunity costs"-esti-
mated in the hundreds of thousands of dollars-for only a portion of an
individual plaintiffs recovery, which at most is a few thousand dollars.
Then, factoring in the uncertainty of success, the appeal for an attorney
to take on an individual plaintiffs antitrust claim shrinks even further....
[T]he Johnson court's third assertion-that any decrease in private en-
forcement actions will be redressed by administrative enforcement-be-
comes even more suspect. When Congress enacts a statute that provides
for both private and administrative enforcement actions, Congress envi-
sions a role for both types of enforcement. Otherwise, Congress would
not have provided for both. Weakening one of those enforcement mech-
anisms seems inconsistent with the Congressional scheme. Eliminating
one of them entirely is surely incompatible with Congress's choice.
Id. (articulating court's rationale). The Kristian decision was not the first circuit
court decision to invalidate a contractual class-arbitration waiver. See Yadava, supra
note 32, at 549 n.12 (noting that Ninth Circuit was first circuit court to invalidate
class-arbitration waiver in Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003)).
58. For a discussion of the two cases decided by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey that share a similar rationale with Kristian, see infra notes 59-68 and accom-
panying text. It should be noted that while the Kristian court used a federal "vindi-
cation of statutory rights" theory to invalidate the class-arbitration waiver at issue,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered the doctrine of unconscionability in
its decision on whether to uphold similar clauses. See Duffy, supra note 38, at 868
(discussing contrasting mechanisms implemented by First Circuit and Supreme
Court of New Jersey).
59. 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2032 (2007).
60. 912 A.2d 104 (N.J. 2006).
61. For a discussion of the differences between the companion cases, see infra
notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
62. See Duffy, supra note 38, at 858 n.95 (discussing difference between
Muhammad and Delta Funding).
63. See Muhammad, 912 A.2d at 99 ("The difference lies in the fact that [the
plaintiffs] individual consumer fraud case involves a small amount of damages,
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court held that the contract precluded the plaintiff from pursuing her
statutory rights-and the rights of any potential class of consumers-and,
therefore, violated NewJersey's public policy. 64 Because the plaintiffs in-
ability to vindicate her statutory rights superseded the defendant's entitle-
ment to seek enforcement of the class-arbitration waiver, the court held
that the clause was unconscionable.6 5
In Delta Funding, however, the court noted that the plaintiffs claim
was "not the type of low-value suit that would not be litigated absent the
availability of a class proceeding."6 6 There, the plaintiff claimed over
$100,000 in damages, and the court determined that such a figure was an
"adequate incentive" to bring the claim as an individual action.67 Thus,
the court found the class-arbitration waiver enforceable.68
D. Gay v. CreditInform: A Rogue Waive
While Muhammad's rationale gained national momentum in the year
following the decision, the Third Circuit's decision in Gay showed that it
rendering individual enforcement of her rights, and the rights of her fellow con-
sumers, difficult if not impossible."); id. at 100 (detailing extent of damages that
could be recovered if prosecuted on individual basis). The New Jersey Supreme
Court, which was considering the validity of class-arbitration waivers for the first
time, noted that "[o]ther courts have referred to such small damage cases as 'nega-
tive value' suits recognizing that they 'would be uneconomical to litigate individu-
ally."' Id. at 97 (citing In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 411 n.1 (5th
Cir. 2004)) (commenting on effect small damage claim has on viability of individ-
ual suit).
64. See id. at 98-99 (finding that NewJersey contract law principles would not
permit enforcement of class-arbitration waiver). To determine whether such an
adhesion contract should be deemed unenforceable based on policy considera-
tions, the court looked to: "(1) the subject matter of the contract, (2) the parties'
relative bargaining positions, (3) the degree of economic compulsion motivating
the 'adhering' party, and (4) the public interests affected by the contract." See id.
at 97 (applying controlling test for determining unconscionability of adhesion con-
tracts (quoting Rudbart v. N.J. Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 605 A.2d 681, 687 (N.J.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 871 (1992))). The court concentrated its analysis on
the fourth factor and found that, although not an exculpatory waiver, the small
amount of damages involved rendered individual enforcement of the plaintiffs
rights virtually impossible. See id. at 99 (declaring class-arbitration waiver at issue
unconscionable).
65. See id. at 100-01 (stating court's holding).
66. See Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 115 (N.J. 2006) (distin-
guishing case from Muhammad).
67. See id. (stating court's holding).
68. See id. (stating court's holding). The court also used Delta Funding to clar-
ify the Muhammad holding. See Dennis Casale, Stephen G. Harvey & Angelo A.
Stio, III, NJ Supreme Court Condemns Class Action Waiver in Consumer Loan Contract
Dispute Involving Low Value Claim, PEPPER HAMILTON ALERT (Aug. 10, 2006), http://
www.pepperlaw.com/publications-update.aspx?ArticleKey=733 (discussing hold-
ing of Delta Funding). The court stated that under NewJersey law, class-arbitration
waivers are not unconscionable per se. See Delta Funding, 912 A.2d at 115 (clarify-
ing Muhammad holding).
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was not yet on board with other jurisdictions. 69 In Gay, the plaintiff
brought an action alleging that the defendant violated the Credit Repair
Organizations Act (CROA)7 0 and the Pennsylvania Credit Services Act
(CSA); 7'1 the defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration.72 The plain-
tiff, in response to this motion, argued that the CROA and the CSA cre-
ated a right to litigate claims in a judicial forum and, further, that the
CROA conferred to consumers the right to proceed in a class action.7 3
69. Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 3395 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating court's
holding).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1679 (2006).
71. 73 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 2181 (2010).
72. See Gay, 511 F.3d at 375 (stating facts and procedural history of case). The
defendant moved to compel arbitration on an individual basis pursuant to the par-
ties' arbitration agreement: "Any claim arising out of or relating to the Product
shall be settled by binding arbitration in accordance with the commercial arbitra-
tion rules of the American Arbitration Association on an individual basis not con-
solidated with any other claim." Id. (stating facts of case).
73. See id. at 377 (discussing plaintiffs arguments). The statute cited by the
plaintiff, which allegedly granted consumers the right to litigate such claims in a
judicial forum, states:
Any buyer or borrower injured by a violation of this act or by the credit
services organization's or loan broker's breach of a contract subject to
this act may bring an action for recovery of damages. Judgment shall be
entered for actual damages, but in no case less than the amount paid by
the buyer or borrower to the credit services organization or loan broker,
plus reasonable attorney fees and costs. An award, if the trial court deems
it proper, may be entered for punitive damages.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 73 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 2191). The plaintiff
made note of the words 'judgment" and "court" to support this contention. See id.
(describing plaintiffs argument that statute granted consumers right to litigate
claims in judicial forum). The CROA provision the plaintiff cited to support her
contention that she could proceed in a class action provides:
(a) Consumer waivers invalid
Any waiver by any consumer of any protection provided by or any right of
the consumer under this subchapter-
(1) shall be treated as void; and
(2) may not be enforced by any Federal or State court or any other
person.
(b) Attempt to obtain waiver
Any attempt by any person to obtain a waiver from any consumer of any
protection provided by or any right of the consumer under this sub-
chapter shall be treated as a violation of this subchapter.
(c) Contracts not in compliance
Any contract for services which does not comply with the applicable pro-
visions of this subchapter-
(1) shall be treated as void; and
(2) may not be enforced by any Federal or State court or any other
person.
Id. at 377-78 (emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1679f (2006)). The plaintiff
further referred to the CSA's anti-waiver provision, which deemed any potential
waiver of the provisions of the CSA to be contrary to public policy and thus unen-
forceable. See id. at 378 ("Any waiver by a buyer or borrower of the provisions of
this act shall be deemed contrary to public policy and shall be void and unenforce-
able." (quoting 73 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 2189(a))).
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Citing the rationale from Johnson, the Third Circuit stated that "a party
seeking to avoid arbitration for a statutory claim has the burden of estab-
lishing that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of the claims."74
The court then compared the CROA and the CSA to the TILA at issue in
Johnson and determined that no such congressional intent existed.7 5
Finally, the Third Circuit rejected the plaintiffs final contention that
the class-arbitration waiver was unconscionable.7 6 An unconvinced Third
Circuit upheld the class-arbitration waiver and, notably, suggested in dicta
that the FAA preempts state law decisions that invalidate class-arbitration
waivers on unconscionability grounds.7 7 Gay attracted a great deal of criti-
cism in the years following the decision, but appeared-at least for a
time-to be an unexpected victory for corporate defendants.7 8
III. THE HomA DECISION: RIGHTING THE SHIP
A. Factual and Procedural Background
In September 2003, the American Express Company (AEC) initiated
a promotional rewards program in which users of its "Blue Cash" credit
card could earn up to five percent cash back on purchases.79 On June 29,
2006, G.R. Homa, a Blue Cash cardholder for over two years, filed a com-
plaint in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
purporting to represent a class of New Jersey Blue Cash cardholders.8 0
Homa alleged that AEC and its wholly owned subsidiary American Express
Centurion Bank (AECB) "misrepresented the actual terms of the rewards
program and failed to award him the promised amount of cash back in
violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA)." 81
74. Id. at 379 (citingjohnson court's rationale).
75. See id. at 379-80 (finding that CROA and CSA do not confer right to bringjudicial action and that CROA does not confer right to proceed as class).
76. See id. at 392 (stating that plaintiffs final claim is that "the arbitration
provision is unconscionable because it requires cases to proceed 'on an individual
basis not consolidated with any other claim'").
77. See id. at 395 (discussing FAA preemption in dicta).
78. See Bland & Prestel, supra note 9, at 389-90 (recognizing Gay as "surprise
victory" for corporate defendants). But see Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225,
229-30 (3d Cir. 2009) (limiting Gay's holding). For a discussion of Homa's limiting
effect on Gay, see infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
79. See Homa 558 F.3d at 226 (describing facts of case). American Express
Company (AEC), a New York corporation, is the ultimate parent of American Ex-
press Centurion Bank (AECB), "a Utah industrial bank engaged in the business of,
among other things, issuing American Express credit cards." See id. (stating factual
background).
80. See id. at 226-27 (describing facts of case). Homa, who was issued a Blue
Cash card on February 8, 2004, brought the class action suit on behalf of "New
Jersey consumers who obtained a Blue Cash card on or after September 30, 2003,
as well as a subclass of New Jersey cardholders who carried a monthly balance on
their cards." See id. (describing class of which Homa was lead plaintiff).
81. See id. at 227 (presenting facts of case).
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AEC and AECB responded by citing two specific provisions from the
cardholder agreement.8 2 The provisions on which the companies relied
contained the controlling terms and conditions of each cardholder's ac-
count.8 3 The first provision, a class-arbitration waiver, required "arbitra-
tion of all claims upon election of either party and . .. specifically required
all claims to 'be arbitrated on an individual basis . . . with no right or
authority for any [c]laims to be arbitrated as a class action.'"84 The sec-
ond clause cited by AEC and AECB, a choice-of-law provision, indicated
"that any disputes arising out of the Agreement would be governed by
Utah state law."85 The defendants argued that these two provisions would
require Homa to arbitrate his claims on an individual basis because class-
arbitration waivers in consumer credit card agreements are expressly valid
and enforceable under Utah law. 8 6
Conversely, Homa argued that New Jersey law should apply.8 7 Homa
contented that the implementation of Utah law would violate NewJersey's
public policy against particular class-arbitration waivers and, therefore,
that the choice of Utah law would be invalid under New Jersey choice-of-
law principles." The district court agreed with AEC and AECB and dis-
82. See id. (describing facts of case). The cardholder agreement was a docu-
ment sent to Homa upon issuance of the Blue Cash card. See id.
83. See id. (detailing facts of case). AEC and AECB filed a motion to compel
arbitration based upon the cardholder agreement between the parties. See id. at
226 (describing procedural posture of case). The cardholder agreement, which
was mailed to Homa upon issuance of the Blue Cash card, was entitled "Agreement
Between American Express Credit Cardmember and American Express Centurion
Bank." See id. at 227 (describing facts of case).
84. Id. (stating terms of class-arbitration waiver); see also Homa v. Am. Express
Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 440, 443 (D.N.J. 2007) (documenting cardholder agreement's
class-arbitration waiver in its entirety), rev'd, 558 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2009). This
provision, in its entirety, states:
If either party elects to resolve a Claim by arbitration, that Claim shall be
arbitrated on an individual basis. There shall be no right or authority for
any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action or on bases involving Claims
brought in a purported representative capacity on behalf of the general
public, other Cardmembers or other persons similarly situated.
Homa, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 443 (providing cardholder agreement's class-arbitration
waiver). For an in-depth explanation of class-arbitration waivers, see supra notes 1-
7 and accompanying text.
85. Homa, 558 F.3d at 227 (describing facts of case); see also Homa, 496 F.
Supp. 2d at 443-44 (quoting cardholder agreement's choice-of-law provision).
This provision, in its entirety, states:
This Agreement and your Account, and all questions about their legality,
enforceability and interpretation, are governed by the laws of the state of
Utah (without regard to internal principles of conflicts of law), and by
applicable federal law. We are located in Utah, hold your Account in
Utah, and entered into this Agreement with you in Utah.
Homa, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 44344 (quoting cardholder agreement's choice-of-law
provision).
86. See Homa, 558 F.3d at 227 (stating defendants' argument in favor of mo-
tion to compel arbitration).
87. See id. (stating plaintiffs argument).
88. See id. (stating plaintiffs argument).
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missed Homa's complaint with prejudice.8 9 As such, the court ordered
Homa to arbitrate his claim on an individual basis.90 Homa refused and
filed an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.91
B. The Third Circuit's Analysis
In Homa, the Third Circuit engaged in a two-part analysis to ascertain
whether the class-arbitration waiver was valid.92 First, the court sought to
determine whether the FAA precluded the application of state law uncon-
scionability principles to void a class-arbitration waiver.93 Second, the
court set out to resolve whether the parties' choice of Utah law could be
enforced under New Jersey's choice-of-law rules.94
1. Third Circuit Declares the FAA Does Not Preclude Application of State Law
Unconscionability Principles
Before considering whether to enforce the choice-of-law provision in
the cardholder agreement, the Third Circuit first had to decide if the FAA
precluded it from applying state law contract defenses.9 5 In answering this
question, the court, following the Supreme Court's interpretation of FAA
Section 2, stated that an agreement to submit to arbitration is enforceable
unless the contract would be invalidated under generally applicable state
law contract defenses, "such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability."9 6 De-
spite the Supreme Court's instruction on this issue, AEC and AECB con-
tended that the Third Circuit's recent decision in Gay precluded it from
applying New Jersey unconscionability principles to a class-arbitration
waiver.9 7 The Third Circuit disagreed and asserted that Gay only compels
89. See id. at 226-27 (outlining procedural history of case and discussing how
district court dismissed complaint after treating credit card companies' motion to
compel as motion to dismiss under FED. R. Cv. P. 12(b) (6)).
90. See id. at 227 (outlining procedural history of case).
91. See id. at 226 (outlining procedural history of case).
92. See id. (summarizing issues presented).
93. See id. at 228-30 (discussing implications of FAA on application of state law
unconscionability principles). For a discussion of the court's analysis of whether
the FAA precludes application of state law unconscionability principles to void a
class-arbitration waiver, see infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
94. See Homa, 558 F.3d at 227-28, 230-34 (discussing enforceability of choice-
of-law provision contained in cardholder agreement). For a discussion of the
court's analysis of the choice-of-law issue, see infra notes 101-20 and accompanying
text.
95. See Homa, 558 F.3d at 226 (outlining analytical framework of decision).
96. See id. at 229-30 ("[S]tate law may be applied if that law arose to govern
issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts gener-
ally. Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or uncon-
scionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without
contravening § 2 [of the FAA]." (quoting Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.
681, 686-87 (1996))).
97. See id. at 230 (stating "appellees argue that, even if the choice-of-law provi-
sion were invalidated and New Jersey law were applied, under Gay the FAA would
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FAA preemption if "it is read as a blanket prohibition on unconscionabil-
ity challenges to class-arbitration provisions."9 8 The court noted, however,
that such a reading directly conflicted with the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of FAA Section 2.9 Thus, Gay's holding was limited, as it purported
to forbid state law contract defenses-"such as fraud, duress, or unconscio-
nability"-to be used.100
2. Third Circuit Determines that New Jersey Law Should Apply and the Class-
Arbitration Waiver Is Likely Unenforceable
After deciding the threshold FAA preemption matter, the Third Cir-
cuit turned to the critical issue of whether to apply Utah or New Jersey
law.' 0 The court noted that if the choice-of-law clause in the cardholder
agreement was valid, Homa's appeal would fail, as Utah law "expressly al-
lows class action waivers in consumer credit agreements." 0 2 AEC and
AECB urged the court to apply Utah law because Utah was the place of
contract, the place of performance, and the place where Homa's account
was located.103 To settle the dispute, the Third Circuit applied New
Jersey's choice-of-law rules because federal courts sitting in diversity apply
preempt us from even considering whether the class-arbitration waiver is
unconscionable. . . .").
98. See id. (stating court's reasoning). The court also made a point to men-
tion that Gay's discussion of whether the FAA preempts state law "appears to be
dicta." See id. at 229 (classifying Gay's discussion of whether FAA preempts Penn-
sylvania law as dicta, "as the Court 'determined that it should enforce the terms of
the choice-of-law provision selecting the application of Virginia law' and con-
cluded that the class waiver at issue was not unconscionable under that law, but
nonetheless engaged in a discussion of unconscionability under Pennsylvania
law"). The court defined dictum as "'a statement in ajudicial opinion that could
have been deleted without seriously impairing the analytical foundations of the
holding."' See id. (quoting In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 616 (3d Cir. 2000)).
99. See id. at 230 (stating Supreme Court clearly held that "generally applica-
ble contract defenses, such as . . . unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate
arbitration agreements without contravening [FAA] § 2").
100. See id. at 229-30 (limiting Gay's holding).
101. See id. at 230 (discussing chronology of analysis).
102. See id. at 227 (explaining Utah law's tolerance of class action waivers in
consumer credit agreements). The Utah statute allows "a creditor [to] contract
with the debtor of an open-end consumer credit contract for a waiver by the
debtor of the right to initiate or participate in a class action related to the open-
end consumer credit contract." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C4-105 (2006).
103. See Homa 558 F.3d at 232 (stating defendants' argument that Utah law
should apply). AEC and AECB further pointed to the choice-of-law clause in the
cardholder agreement to demonstrate that Utah law should apply. See id. at 227
(discussing defendants' arguments). Among other things, the choice-of-law provi-
sion stated: "We are located in Utah, hold your Account in Utah, and entered into
this Agreement with you in Utah." See Homa v. Am. Express Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d




Millman: Catching the Waive: The Third Circuit Joins the Growing Trend of
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the forum state's choice-of-law rules. 104 In NewJersey, "when parties to a
contract have agreed to be governed by the laws of a particular state, New
Jersey courts will uphold the contractual choice if it does not violate New
Jersey's public policy." 0 5 The Third Circuit noted that, when deciding
whether a contractual choice-of-law provision is enforceable, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey has relied on the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of
Laws § 187(2).106 The Restatement provides that the law of the state chosen
by the parties will apply unless:
application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater inter-
est than the chosen state in the determination of the particular
issue and which . . . would be the state of the applicable law in
the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.1 0 7
Considering the Restatement, the court agreed with the Muhammad
principle that a class-arbitration waiver can violate NewJersey public policy
where the waiver is found in a contract of adhesion and where the antici-
pated individual recovery involves a particularly small amount of asserted
damages. 0 8 The Third Circuit determined that, as in Muhammad, the
contract at issue had the characteristics of an adhesion contract.' 09 Fur-
thermore, the court stated that Homa's underlying claim involved a "pre-
dictably small amount of damages" because the claim implicated less than
five percent of his total credit card balance.' 1 0 Therefore, the court found
104. See Homa, 558 F.3d at 227 ("In evaluating whether a contractual choice-
of-law clause is enforceable, federal courts sitting in diversity apply the choice-of-
law rules of the forum state, which in this case is New Jersey.").
105. Id. (emphasis added) (describing New Jersey method of analyzing
choice-of-law issue).
106. See id. (examining New Jersey choice-of-law rules).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcrs OF LAws § 187(2) (b) (1969).
108. See Homa, 558 F.3d at 231 (explaining "prediction" that Supreme Court
of New Jersey would find that class-arbitration waiver violates fundamental public
policy of New Jersey).
109. See id. (comparing contract at issue to contract in Muhammad). The
court stated that the contract at issue possessed the "hallmarks of a contract of
adhesion" because it was "'presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis ... in a standard-
ized printed form, and without opportunity for the 'adhering party' to negotiate
except perhaps on a few particulars.'" Id. (citation omitted) (analyzing contract at
issue against indicia of contracts of adhesion).
110. See id. (explaining why class-arbitration waiver violates New Jersey's fun-
damental public policy). The amount in dispute was foreseeably capped at five
percent of Homa's total credit card balance because the original claim involved
the Blue Cash card promotion, which purported to provide cardholders with five
percent cash back on purchases made with the card. See id. at 226-27 (stating
case's facts). Still, because the district court made no findings of fact as to the
potential value of Homa's claims (it treated AEC's Motion to Compel Arbitration
as a Motion to Dismiss) the case had to be remanded. See id. at 233 (explaining
that district court still had to determine whether "the claims at issue are of such a
low value as effectively to preclude relief if decided individually").
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that the class-arbitration waiver violated New Jersey's fundamental public
policy as applied to small-sum claims.1 11
The Third Circuit then turned to the remaining portion of the Re-
statement and analyzed whether New Jersey or Utah had a materially
greater interest in resolving the issue. 112 The court's analysis considered
each state's contacts with the parties to the litigation, and the policy rea-
sons underlying the states' conflicting laws.113 The court determined that,
given these considerations-"particularly New Jersey's interest in protect-
ing its consumers' ability to enforce their rights under the [NJCFA]"-the
Supreme Court of New Jersey would find that New Jersey had a materially
greater interest than Utah in the dispute.1 14 Thus, the court held that "if
this is a small-sum case, then the Supreme Court of New Jersey would ap-
ply NewJersey law to the class-arbitration waiver."1 15
Lastly, the court applied New Jersey law to Homa's unconscionability
claim.11 6 The court held: " [I]f the claims at issue are of such a low value
as effectively to preclude relief if decided individually, then, under
Muhammad, the application of Utah law to the class-arbitration waiver is
111. See id. (stating court's holding). This was not the end of the court's anal-
ysis, as it still had to discuss the rest of the test enumerated in the Restatement. See
id. (acknowledging next step in choice-of-law analysis).
112. See id. at 231 (stating that court combined remaining Restatement analysis,
namely "that New Jersey law would apply in the absence of the parties' choice-of-
law provisions and that NewJersey has a materially greater interest that Utah in the
determination of the waiver's validity"). The court combined the remaining analy-
sis because "as NewJersey choice-of-law rules 'require application of the law of the
state with the greatest interest in resolving the particular issue that is raised in the
underlying litigation,' New Jersey Law will necessarily apply in the absence of an
agreement if New Jersey has a materially greater interest." Id. (explaining court's
rationale).
113. See id. at 232 (discussing court's analysis). First, the court documented
that "New Jersey's governmental-interest analysis requires an initial inquiry into
whether there is an actual conflict between the laws of Utah and New Jersey." Id.
The court found that there was a stark conflict between the states' laws. See id.
("Comparison of Muhammad, which declared unconscionable a class-arbitration
waiver that would preclude relief under New Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act, with
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70CA-105, which explicitly states that class-action waivers in
open-end consumer credit contracts are valid, reveals such a conflict."). Finding
an actual conflict, the court sought to "identify the governmental policies underly-
ing the law of each state and how those policies [were] affected by each state's
contacts to the litigation and to the parties' so that [it could] determine which
state [had] the greater interest." Id.
114. See id. at 232-33 ("Given [each state's contacts and policy reasons], we
predict that the Supreme Court of New Jersey would determine that New Jersey
has a materially greater interest than Utah in the enforceability of a class-arbitra-
tion waiver that could operate to preclude a New Jersey consumer from relief
under the NJCFA."). The court determined that New Jersey's strong consumer
protection laws trumped Utah's pro-business stance on class-arbitration waivers.
See id. at 232 (discussing which state had materially greater interest).
115. Id. (stating court's holding).
116. See id. at 233 (explaining final portion of court's decision).
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unconscionable."' 1 7 The Third Circuit's decision reversed the district
court's order dismissing the case in favor of arbitration, and the case was
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the decision.1 18
IV. THE STORM SURGE: ANALYZING HoMA's IMPACT
The Homa decision is consistent with the growing trend among circuit
courts to invalidate contractual class-arbitration waivers in consumer con-
tracts.1 19 The decision is significant to the Third Circuit's treatment of
class-arbitration waivers and, more broadly, to federal class-arbitration
waiver jurisprudence in two primary ways. 120 First, by voiding AECB's
class-arbitration waiver, Homa instructs companies to adopt extensive risk
prevention measures in consumer contracts in order to enhance the likeli-
hood that an arbitration provision will be enforced.12 1 Second, by hold-
ing that the FAA does not preempt consideration of state law contract
defenses, it eliminates the circuit split on the preemption issue that Gay
purportedly created.12 2
117. Id. (stating court's holding).
118. See id. (stating court's disposition). Judge Weis, in his concurrence,
stated that the court remanded essentially because the district court's ruling was
constrained by FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) and thus "did not fully address all of the
matters relevant to the contention that the Cardmember Agreement contain [ed]
an unconscionable class-action waiver." See id. at 233 (Weis, J., concurring) (dis-
cussing reason for remand). The lower court on remand was to consider the ques-
tion of unconscionability under NewJersey law. See id. ("Because all of the factors
bearing on [the unconscionability] issue are not pertinent to our limited review in
this case, the question of unconscionability under NewJersey law remains open for
consideration on remand."). Nonetheless, the Third Circuit went through the req-
uisite analysis and predicted that the lower court would find the class-arbitration
waiver to be unconscionable. See id. at 233 (majority opinion) (finding class-arbi-
tration waiver unconscionable).
119. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 854-55 (9th Cir. 2009)
(finding class-arbitration waiver unconscionable). The Laster court implemented a
three-part test to determine whether a class-arbitration waiver in a consumer con-
tract is unconscionable: "(1) is the agreement a contract of adhesion; (2) are dis-
putes between the contracting parties likely to involve small amounts of damages;
and (3) is it alleged that the party with superior bargaining power has carried out a
scheme deliberately to cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small
sums of money." See id. (analyzing class-arbitration waiver's validity); Dale v. Com-
cast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[W]e conclude the Comcast
class action waiver is unconscionable to the extent it prohibits the subscribers from
bringing a class action alleging state law claims based on a violation of the Cable
Act's franchise fee provisions."); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 64 (1st
Cir. 2006) (holding class-arbitration waiver unenforceable). For a complete dis-
cussion of the Kristian decision, see supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
120. For a discussion of the significance of Homa on class-arbitration waiver
jurisprudence, see infra notes 123-48 and accompanying text.
121. For a discussion of Homa's impact on corporate contract drafting, see
infra notes 123-36 and accompanying text.
122. See Homa, 558 F.3d at 230 (rejecting argument that, under Gay, FAA pre-
cludes court from applying state law unconscionability principles to void class-arbi-
tration waiver). For a discussion of the implications of the court's holding
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A. The Impact of Homa's Implied Lessons
In light of Homa, companies must now review and modify the arbitra-
tion clauses in their consumer contracts to enhance the likelihood that
such provisions will survive litigation.1 2 3 There are a number of prevent-
ative practices companies should implement to withstand Homa's prece-
dent.124  Most importantly, because Homa appears to sever the
unenforceable class-arbitration waiver from the remainder of the arbitra-
tion clause, companies should include nonseverability provisions in their
arbitration clauses. 125 Such provisions should state that the entire arbitra-
tion clause is null and void if the class-arbitration waiver is invalidated. 126
Failing to include a nonseverability provision would put a company in the
precarious position of being unable to appeal a potentially unfavorable
class-arbitration verdict.127
Additionally, Homa impliedly recommended several steps that compa-
nies can take to draft more enforceable class-arbitration waivers. 128 These
steps are reflected in the factors the Homa court considered in voiding the
class-arbitration waiver: the parties' relative bargaining positions; whether
regarding the FAA preemption issue, see infra notes 137-41 and accompanying
text.
123. For a discussion of Homa's impact on corporate contract drafting and
the contract modifications that corporations should make, see infra notes 123-36
and accompanying text.
124. For a discussion of preventative practices for companies, see infra notes
121-41 and accompanying text.
125. See Homa, 558 F.3d at 233 (relying on Muhammad to invalidate class-arbi-
tration waiver). Reliance on Muhammad would lead the Third Circuit to sever the
unenforceable class-arbitration waiver while enforcing the rest of the arbitration
clause. See Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 91 (N.J.
2006) ("[T]he appropriate remedy in these circumstances is to sever the uncon-
scionable provision and enforce the otherwise valid arbitration agreement."); see
also Dawson, supra note 35 (detailing that one preventative drafting practice is to
"include language that the mandatory arbitration provision will be rendered null
and void in its entirety if a court (or arbitrator) determines that the waiver of class
relief is unenforceable").
126. See Dawson, supra note 35, at 13 (providing language that should be in-
cluded in nonseverability provision); Roger A. Lewis & Jonathan H. Claydon, Class
Arbitration Waiver Provisions Under Attack in Third Circuit, GOLDBERG KOHN ALERT
(Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.goldbergkohn.com/news-alerts-133.html ("As a pri-
mary protection, it is advisable to include a nonseverability clause in the arbitra-
tion provision stating that the arbitration provision cannot be enforced if the class
arbitration waiver is invalidated.").
127. See Lewis & Claydon, supra note 126 ("Most companies do not want to
find themselves in 'class' arbitration, which has all or more of the usual risks of
class litigation but without the protection of a meaningful right of appeal.").
AECB included a nonseverability provision in its arbitration clause, although it is
unclear whether the district court will honor it on remand. See Homa, 558 F.3d at
234 (Weis, J., concurring) ("[S] hould any portion of th [e] 'Restrictions on Arbitra-
tion' provision be deemed invalid or unenforceable, then the entire Arbitration
Provision (other than this sentence) shall not apply.").
128. For a discussion of Homa's implied lessons, see infra notes 129-36 and
accompanying text.
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the waiver was presented in a contract of adhesion; and whether the size of
the damages effectively precluded the plaintiff from bringing an individ-
ual claim. 129 First, the court's inherent disapproval of adhesion contracts
may be assuaged by presenting the contract to the consumer as fairly as
possible.' This involves ensuring that the class-arbitration waiver is in-
cluded in the contract in a manner that is "prominent, clear, conspicuous
and understandable." 3 1 Further, by ensuring that the consumer know-
ingly agreed to the waiver, a company can balance the parties' relative
bargaining positions.' 32 To do so, companies should both employ proce-
dural mechanisms and provide the consumer with the option to reject the
arbitration agreement.' 33
Finally, a company can alleviate the impractical costs for consumers
who bring an individual claim by contractually agreeing to bear the cost of
the individual arbitration.' 3 4 As the Homa decision was primarily predi-
cated on the low-value claim's effect on the viability of an individual ac-
tion, the inclusion of a reimbursement or cost-shifting provision arguably
129. See Homa, 558 F.3d at 231-32 (stating court's analysis); id. at 233 (Weis,J.,
concurring) (noting additional factors considered by court).
130. See id. at 231 (majority opinion) (noting that class-arbitration waivers
that are found in contracts of adhesion can be "problematic"); Lewis & Claydon,
supra note 126 (instructing companies that, in Homa's wake, "the contract contain-
ing the class arbitration waiver [should be] presented to the consumer in as fair a
manner as possible").
131. See Dawson, supra note 35 (urging corporations to draft language in arbi-
tration agreements in particular way).
132. See Homa, 558 F.3d at 233 (Weis,J., concurring) (listing "the parties' rela-
tive bargaining positions" among factors relied on by Muhammad court-and in
turn considered by Homa court-in determining whether to strike class-arbitration
bans); Pivoris v. TCF Fin. Corp., No. 07 C 2673, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90562, at
*12 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2007) (explaining substantial steps company took to ensure
consumer understood and knowingly agreed to class-arbitration waiver). In Pivoris,
the class-arbitration waiver was enforced, among other reasons, because the corpo-
rate defendant had required the plaintiff to separately initial the clause and be-
cause the contract cautioned the plaintiff to "read this Arbitration provision
carefully." See Pivoris, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90562, at *2-3 (describing characteris-
tics of enforceable class-arbitration waiver).
133. See Pivoris, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90562, at *3 ("[The plaintiff] was enti-
tled to reject the arbitration clause by 'mailing a written rejection notice' within
thirty days."); Dawson, supra note 35 (explaining choice that should be given to
consumers). For a discussion of the procedural mechanisms in Pivoris, see supra
note 132 and accompanying text.
134. See Dawson, supra note 35 (arguing that "the company should bear the
cost of the arbitration of individual disputes"); see also Daniel R. Higginbotham,
Buyer Beware: Why the Class Arbitration Waiver Clause Presents a Gloomy Future for Con-
sumers, 58 DuKE L.J. 103, 133 (2008) ("Another way to lower consumers' costs is to
shift some or all of the arbitration filing fees to the drafting party."). Cf Pivoris,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90562, at *5 (indicating that arbitration clause provided that
company would not seek to recover arbitration or attorney's fees); Higginbotham,
supra, at 134 ("Perhaps the easiest way to lower costs is to require losing businesses
to reimburse all of a claimant's reasonable attorney's fees.").
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would have changed the outcome of the case. 3 5 Such a provision would
have required AECB to cover the fees associated with the arbitration and
would have effectively allowed Homa to bring the low-value claim
individually.'s3
B. Elimination of the Circuit Split on the FAA Preemption Issue
The Homa decision clarified the muddled precedent the Third Circuit
established in Gay.'3 7 Gay had prompted companies across the nation to
argue that a circuit split existed as to the enforceability of class-arbitration
waivers and that the FAA preempted state law contract defenses. 1 3 8 In
response, many lower courts, particularly in the Third Circuit, reached
decisions that barred class actions in the arbitral setting.' 39 The Homa
decision, however, clarified that Gay's FAA preemption language was
merely dicta and, in so doing, effectively eliminated the purported circuit
split on the issue.1 40 Had the Third Circuit declined to limit Gay's hold-
135. See Homa, 558 F.3d at 233 (holding class-arbitration waiver unconsciona-
ble if claims at issue "are of such low value as effectively to preclude relief if de-
cided individually"). Some arbitration organizations have predetermined cost
shifting rules. See Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Consumer Arbitration Costs, http://www.
adr.org/sp.asp?id=22039 ("If the consumer's claim ... does not exceed $10,000,
then the consumer is responsible for one-half the arbitrator's fees up to a maxi-
mum of $125."). Nevertheless, even such consumer-protective cost shifting strate-
gies do not help with very small claims. See Higginbotham, supra note 134, at 133
("For many consumers, the $125 fee alone prevents filing a claim. As a result, the
rules should provide that, for consumers with low-value claims, the business must
pay the consumer's fees.").
136. See Homa, 558 F.3d at 231 (holding that class-arbitration waiver violated
New Jersey public policy-namely, consumers' ability to effectively pursue their
rights under consumer protection law-because of small value of claim).
137. See Bland & Prestel, supra note 9, at 390-91 (explaining Homa's limiting
effect on Gay).
138. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, 128
S. Ct. 2500 (2008) (No. 07-976) (arguing that, under Gay, state law is preempted by
FAA).
139. See, e.g., Shubert v. Wells Fargo Auto Fin., Inc., No. 08-3754, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 105198, at *25 (D.N.J. Dec. 31, 2008) (holding class-arbitration waiver
enforceable on basis that "Gay [court] distinctly analyzed the no-class action arbi-
tration [clause] and found that federal law preempted the conflicting state law");
Kudos to the Third Circuit for Preserving Class Actions, LABOVICK INJURY LAw BLOG
(Feb. 25, 2009), http://injurylaw.labovick.com/tags/homa-v-american-express-
compan/ ("[Gay] prompted several U.S. district courts in New Jersey to dismiss
class actions in the last year.").
140. See Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding Gay's
preemption language to be dicta and not barrier to court's application of state
law); see also Visions of Circuit Split, MORIUSON FOERSTER FIN. SERvs. REPORT (Mar. 9,
2009), http://www.mofo.com/financial-services-report-spring-2009-03-09-2009/#9
("Class waiver enthusiasts thought they'd discovered the Holy Grail for Supreme
Court review when the Third Circuit issued Gay, a murky decision that seemed to
stand for the proposition that state law class waiver analysis was preempted by the
FAA."); Deepak Gupta, Third Circuit Strikes Down Class-Action Ban, Eliminates Claimed
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ing, corporate defendants in many jurisdictions would continue to have a
strong argument that plaintiffs are precluded from arguing state law con-
tract defenses-conceivably the most effective argument that plaintiffs
possess.141
V. CONCLUSION: THE CASE FOR AN "UNWAIVERING" JUDICIAL STANDARD
The enforceability of class action bans in mandatory arbitration
clauses remains one of the most hotly contested issues in consumer litiga-
tion. 14 2 A growing number of courts have held such waivers unenforce-
able under an array of theories.1 43 While the circuit courts now seem fully
aware that the plight of consumers has been exacerbated by the prolifera-
tion of class-arbitration waivers, the courts are lacking a uniform judicial
standard to address the problem. 144
The approach used by the Homa court provides a standard to effec-
tively adjudicate the issue. 1 4 5 Adopting Homa's indicia involves a totality of
saction-ban-eliminates-claimed-circuit-split.html (discussing rise and fall of
"claimed circuit split" on FAA preemption issue).
141. See, e.g., Brief for CTIA - The Wireless Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Petitioners, T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, 128 S. Ct. 2500 (2008) (No. 07-976)
(arguing that "the text and history of the FAA make clear that Congress never
intended for state policy judgments about what is substantively unfair to provide a
ground for invalidating an otherwise proper arbitration clause.").
142. See Bland & Prestel, supra note 9, at 370 (commenting on vigorous de-
bate surrounding enforceability of class-arbitration waivers); Duffy, supra note 38,
at 848 ("The validity of class action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion has
been a hotly contested topic in contract law."); Lewis & Claydon, supra note 126
(noting that enforceability of class action waiver provisions in mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses is "[o] ne of the most contentious issues in consumer class action litiga-
tion in recent years").
143. For a discussion of the contract defenses that have voided class-arbitra-
tion waivers, see supra notes 92-118 and accompanying text. For further back-
ground on the arguments available to plaintiffs, see Rice, supra note 3, at 246-52
(listing several arguments).
144. See Higginbotham, supra note 134, at 115 (noting that Supreme Court
has yet to decide issue); see also Rice, supra note 3, at 256 (explaining need for
judicial standard, and proposing two-prong analysis to Supreme Court). Rice's
proposed test elaborates upon tests implemented in past circuit court decisions:
This analysis would begin with determining if the contract was a product
of a negotiation between sophisticated parties with similar bargaining po-
sitions. If the Court so determined, the agreement would be valid and
enforceable. If, however, the Court determined the contract is one in
which there was little or no negotiation or it was a standard-form or adhe-
sion contract and the plaintiff had no reasonable alternative to the trans-
action, the Court would then step through an analysis of the agreement
and determine whether it restricts the plaintiffs substantive rights.
Rice, supra note 3, at 256 (proposing judicial standard).
145. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's rationale in Homa, see supra notes
92-118 and accompanying text. The issue could also be resolved by pending con-
gressional legislation that seeks to void specific types of arbitration provisions. See
Wilson, supra note I ("The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 would ban provisions
requiring arbitration of (1) an employment, consumer, or franchise dispute, or
(2) a dispute arising under any statute intended to protect civil rights.").
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the circumstances analysis that assesses whether: (1) the claim involves a
presumably small amount of damages; (2) the class-arbitration waiver is
presented in a contract of adhesion; (3) the parties enjoy relatively equal
bargaining positions; and (4) the waiver provision affects the public inter-
ests involved in the case.' 4 6 Implementation of such a standard, coupled
with modified consumer contracts that take into account the risk preven-
tion measures discussed in Part IV.A, could resolve the class-arbitration
waiver issue.' 4 7 Widespread adoption of this standard would ensure that:
(1) companies can continue to use the class-arbitration waiver mechanism,
thereby remaining protected from colossal class action judgments; and (2)
consumers can vindicate their statutory rights without being taken advan-
tage of by unconscionable contracts of adhesion. 148
Steven D. Millman
146. See Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225, 230-34 (3d Cir. 2009) (iden-
tifying factors used to reach decision).
147. For a discussion of how the standard would solve the problem, see supra
note 146 and accompanying text.
148. For a complete discussion of how the standard would achieve these re-
sults, see supra notes 107-13, 123-36 and accompanying text.
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